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Abstract The international diamond trade always has been a somewhat closed
world in which different rules applied compared to other sectors. The myths and
mystic surrounding diamonds as the most precious material on earth are in sharp
contract with the contemporary demand for transparency. The clarity of a diamond,
one of its four valuables, is not reflected in the ways of the diamond industry.
However, recent initiatives, such as the Kimberly Process, which attempts to put a
ban on blood and terror diamonds and a handful of banking scandals, have brought a
wind of change. This wind of change is to some extent a mere side-wind fanned by
the hurricane of the global anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing
movement. Banks financing the diamond trade, assurance companies providing
insurances to the sector and the diamond traders and retailers have all become
subject to AML and CFT legislation. Compliance has become the magic word in the
world of financing, along with transparency, but the diamond sector proved to be a
slack student in this respect. This paper explores the different aspects of compliance
by diamond sector market players and examines whether the extension of the
regulatory framework to these players have brought a shift in responsibility, away
from the financial institutions financing the diamond sector. In addition it addresses
the question whether the regulatory framework and regulatory practice are
sufficiently developed to enable effective supervision by the authorities.
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The diamond sector: the opacity of an ‘insider’ world
The phrase “Diamonds are forever” has become a commonplace for all those who at
least once in a lifetime has shown some interest in jewellery. And who has not. In
Western culture, and recently also in Asian culture, wedding and engagement rings, to
many couples do not deserve these titles when not containing a well cut shiny diamond.
The diamond symbolizes the infinite commitment of the lovers and the indestructible
nature of their relation. Of course it is merely a symbol! In fact, the phrase itself has not
existed forever, but was coined in 1947 by an advertisement firm in the service of De
Beers, the largest diamond extraction and distribution company since that time. It was a
clever marketing move, in which the image of the diamond as a jewellery item—which
had become somewhat stuffy—was successfully repolished, reviving the diamond as a
desired object associating its owner with wealth and social status.
De Beers, until recently run by the ‘dynasty’ of the Oppenheimer Family, was and
still is the world’s largest owner of diamond mines and at its height De Beers was
estimated to extract and trade up to 80% of the rough diamonds globally [24: 19].
This strong market position enabled the Beers to artificially influence the price of
rough diamond and, thereby to dominate the diamond market. For further
distribution De Beers used an exclusive system of preferred vendors: the so-called
sight-holders were the only outlets to whom De Beers sold its diamonds.
The diamond sector is also an ‘insider’ business in many other respects. The
world centre for the conversion of rough diamonds to jewellery is formed by the
cutting firms in Antwerp, even after the diamond crisis in beginning of the 1980s,
after which many of the cutting activities shifted to regions providing cheaper labour
force, such as India and China [24] and later (2000–2005) to Dubai. The Antwerp
cutting centres are virtually all in hands of (orthodox) Jewish migrants, who as a
religious minority in a primarily Catholic Belgium, form a closed subculture.
However, only seen from the outside, the Jewish immigrants may form a
homogeneous subculture. Beneath that surface there are many different groups with
quite different origins (Russian, Georgian, Central European) living together other in
the Antwerp diamond quarter. Lately the Indian minority in Antwerp, in particular
those originating from the region of Gujarat, seem to seek an increase of their market
share and have become more active in the Antwerp diamond trade [25]. Nevertheless
the diamond industry can still be described as ‘a (virtually) closed industry guild
with high entry barriers’ [8: 35].
Until recently, bargains were often not clinched on paper, but by exclamation of the
word Mazzel!, freely translated as Good Luck!, and in the context of business to be
understood as I take your word for it. In a way that is both very symbolic and very
pragmatic agreements and business alliances were based in trust and often backed by
family ties, long-standing friendship ties or other means of social control. This
traditional way of conducting business “minimizes the need for extensive record
keeping and transparency” [8:35]. Similar grounds formed the fundaments for
financial service providing. As if in the diamond sector time has come to a standstill
for over a 100 years, it was until the end of the 20th century common practice for
banks to provide diamond firms credit on a basis of trust rather than a solid analysis of
the actual value of the assets guaranteeing the loan. The trust was mutual and so were
the breaches thereof, as can be illustrated by a case involving a major bank in which
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defrauding bank employees embezzled money from client accounts for an amount
equivalent to roughly 80 million Euros.1
But the times have changed. The diamond sector is increasingly permeated by
‘outsiders’—such as the Georgian Israeli Lev Leviev, who effectively broke the De
Beers monopoly2—and the playing field becomes more crowded with more
‘dynamic’ players. Mutual trust is no longer sufficient as the primary basis for
business cooperation. The diamond sector itself was late admitting this and it were
external factors which ultimately forced the diamond sector to start adhering to new
views, for example on the reduction of threats and risks inherent to the diamond
trade. On the one hand, there was an increasing pressure from the international
community to adopt measures against money laundering and the financing of
terrorism. By labelling the diamond traders as ‘financial institutions’ and as
‘gatekeepers’, the diamond sector was—with a simple stroke of legislation—put
on the stage of international anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the
financing of terrorism (CFT).
But the wind also blows from other directions. The notion of ‘blood diamonds’
and terror diamonds, vividly displayed in the Hollywood movie picture ‘Blood
Diamonds’, seriously affected the carefully maintained image of the diamond as the
most pure gem. Suddenly the diamond sector had to accept an external form of
regulation in the form of rules and standards imposed by the Kimberly Process (see
below). Diamonds had to be certified in order to ensure that they not originated from
beneficiaries who used the diamond profits to finance their participation in the civil
wars on the African continent. If a respectable reputation is the most important (but
also most vulnerable asset) to any self-respecting business [5, 8] then the diamond
sector, figuratively floating on the myth and reputation of the jewel of eternity, is
bound to invest all possible effort to uphold its reputation. In the current era this
implies full adherence to international AML and CFT standards.
Together these developments forced the once inwardly looking diamond world to
open up, to become more transparent and to be accountable to other entities than the
‘traditional’ bodies of self-regulation such as the High Council for Diamonds.
To understand the vulnerabilities of the diamond sector for abuse by criminals and
money laundering the next section describes the diamond sector in its international
context, followed by some brief remarks on conflict diamonds and the usefulness of
diamonds as an alternative for criminals to cash money.
Conflict diamonds
Diamond trade is a truly global trade. Its production geography is entirely
determined by the richness of diamond as a natural resource. Diamonds are found
1 For various reasons clients who held accounts at the bank’s specialized diamond office in Amsterdam
had opted for a hold-mail agreement, implying that the mail relating to the accounts (such as monthly
balance sheets) was not send to them, but kept at the office in Amsterdam. This created a significant
vulnerability, as it effectively disabled timely detection by the account-holder /victim that unauthorized
sums were wired from his account.
2 Sharon Wrobel, Leviev attacks De Beers pricing policy, The Jerusalem Post, 29 NJune 2006.
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on all continents. Most renowned for their riches in diamond are the West and South
African countries, such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, The Congo’s, Angola, South Africa
and Tanzania, countries that are not only rich of diamond mines, but also known for
the alluvial (surface) mining activities taking place.3
Some countries rich in diamond, such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola, are or
have been involved in (civil) war and the participating war lords took advantage of the
diamond resources to replenish their war chests [15, 16, 26]. They seek control over
the diamond mines and (illegal) wholesale to the detriment of the people inhabiting the
region. In the Global Witness [13] report For a Few Dollar$ More ‘conflict diamonds’
are defined as ‘[...] rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance
a conflict aimed at undermining legitimate government’. Conflict diamonds are also
referred to as ‘blood diamonds’. The Global Witness definition and other similar
definitions have been criticised for their biased focus on rough diamonds. Polished
diamonds are exempted from this definition and therefore (as we will see) from the
Kimberly Certification Program. The definition put forward by the UN4 does not have
this deficit, but still has in common with other definitions that it limits the notion of
conflict diamonds to a particular type of conflict, hence illicit behaviour.5 [21: 6].
In 2002 it was estimated that between 3% and 15% of the rough diamond trade
concerns conflict diamonds [12: 11; 21: 6]. Conflict diamonds are the cause of the
continuation of suffering because it profits enables of the prolongation of military
activities and related civil unrest which otherwise would have come to an end because of
exhaution of other resources. Their strategic importance have increased such that control
over the mines have become a major cause of the conflict [3, 28]. It goes without saying
that warlords, who act on the verge of political and military (il)legality have vested
interests to keep the diamond industry in their region as opaque as possible.
A suitable tool for money smuggling and laundering
Although often times mentioned in the same breath, there is a conceptual difference
between ‘blood diamonds’ and so-called ‘terror diamonds’. Obviously not because
the diamonds are different, but because of the purpose for which they are traded and
the nature of the activities of those benefiting from the trade. Whereas blood
diamonds, as described above, are used for the funding of open conflicts and (civil)
war, primarily by local war lords in Africa, terror diamonds can be used for the
3 Alluvial diamonds do not have to be excavated because they can be found in riverbeds of streams which
carry eroded rough diamonds over large distances.
4 “Diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and
internationally recognized governments, and are used to fund military action in opposition to those
governments or in contravention of the decisions of the Security Council” (www.un.org/peace/africa/
Diamond.html, updated 21 march 2001, no longer available)
5 Passas and Jones’ criticism to the definition of conflict diamonds extends to the limited scope of any
notion of conflict diamonds. Diamonds can be (and are) implicated in many forms of illicit behaviour
there is little sense in singling out diamonds used in one particular type of illicit activity as this draws
away the attention from the wider problem. Referring to estimates by Smillie in 2002, Passas and Jones
mention 20% as the share of illicit diamonds (linked to any type of illegal activity) relative to the overall
trade, whereas conflict diamonds represent ‘only’ 4% [21: 6 and 7].
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funding of a different kind of war, namely the one waged by internationally
operating terrorist organisations. Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and other (alleged) terrorist
organisations have repeatedly been associated with the trade in diamonds.
Seen from a ‘war’ funding perspective both the terrorist cells and the African war
lords utilize diamonds in much similar ways. In both contexts diamonds are used, as
a form of easy-to-handle cash, which can easily be smuggled. The rough diamond
industry is very diverse and diamonds often change hands in a multiplayer ‘pipeline’
[12, 21]. In the case of blood diamonds weapons are often purchased abroad or the
payment somehow ends up in foreign accounts held by undisclosed ultimate
beneficiaries. Due to their geographical spread, terrorist cells in need of funds have
to face the problem to get the money available without being noticed. A visible
money trail is a major risk factor for anyone involved in illicit activity. Not only will
the gatekeepers (banks and other financial institutions) be alerted and file a
suspicious activity report to the local authorities, but transactions carried out through
licit channels also create a paper trail that is easily traceable by financial
investigators. Diamonds, for a number of reasons, fit the profile of an (almost)
ideal money transfer vehicle (similar [21: 9]) and are used for informal value transfer
[20: 69]. The fluctuations in value are relatively small so they retain their value over
a longer period of time [24]; they are of small volume and therefore easy to conceal;
they are without smell, meaning that sniffer dogs—one of the main weapons of any
customs unit—are unable to detect hidden diamonds; furthermore, diamonds have
no expiry date and can be kept in storage endlessly under various conditions and
with no effect to their material qualities. In addition diamonds are ‘pressed cash’ [2],
enabling smugglers to carry high value in low volumes without getting noticed
(hiding diamonds representing a value of €250.000 is much easier than hiding the
equivalent in euro or dollar notes). Fijnaut cs. in their study of organised crime
mention an investigation in which diamonds had been used as value carriers in a
Dutch–Canadian–Singapore connection: the equivalent of multiple millions of Dutch
guilders had been smuggled between these countries [10]. In addition, diamonds
have a ‘global’ coverage—especially important to international terrorist organisa-
tions—implying that diamonds can be traded both at the locations where preparatory
activities take place (e.g. in training camps) and in target areas where final
preparations (e.g. the attendance of flight lessons) need to be paid. In this respect the
international network of diamond traders may (unwittingly) serve as an alternative to
some forms of underground banking.
Compared to bank notes, diamonds are a favourable form of cash, with the main
difference that you cannot purchase goods in the upper world economy or make cash
deposits at a regular bank without being noticed. To do that, one first needs to
convert the diamonds into bank notes which means that one needs to know a place
where that can be done without exposing oneself to risks of detection. It is alleged
that in underground banking systems, such as Hawala and Fei Chien diamonds are
used as one of many instruments to settle the disbalance between accounts [23].
In addition, diamonds are ideal money laundering vehicles, because of the difficulty
to objectively establish their value. That means that artificial turnover and profits are
easily generated in a bogey, apparently licit, diamond trade and that exaggerated
profits do not stand out and, thus, are not easily detected. These practical features do
not mean that diamonds do have no disadvantages at all for criminals.
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From a risk management perspective the many qualities of diamonds—for example
from a money launderer’s perspective—have an inherent disadvantage, also to the
criminals. Smugglers, for example, may easily be tempted to run off with the diamonds
for their own personal gain. War lords and terrorist organisations commissioning the
smuggling, therefore, have to resort to ‘security’ measures to prevent smugglers from
embezzling the diamonds or getting ripped. Whatever the means applied to achieve this,
it entails additional costs to safeguard proper delivery of the expensive merchandise,
thus affecting the cost-effectiveness of diamonds as a means of value transfer. In
addition, the difficulty in determining the value of a diamond—which is a practical
feature in case of money laundering—does make it difficult for the criminal traders too
to verify the value of the commodity. The distrustful ‘count the money’ is not equivalent
to ‘count the diamonds’: it takes an expert to verify the value of the commodity and even
he probably needs more time than available ‘on the spot’. To have a successful and
secure exchange one needs a quiet spot and bring along an expert capable of assessing
the value. Again these are cost- and time increasing elements influencing the cost-
effectiveness of diamonds as criminal currency.
All in all diamonds make for a handy tool for those who want to smuggle money
(value) cross-border or who must launder dirty money in order to be able to use it for
upperworld investment and expenditure. But that by itself does not imply that the
diamond trade as a whole is heavily implicated in money laundering. The Anecdotal
evidence presented in the literature (e.g. [22])6 may prove that occasionally diamond
traders are actively and wittingly involved in money laundering operations, but it
does not corroborate claims that the diamond sectors is widely abused for money
laundering purposes.
Involvement of Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and others
Even-Zohar [8: 11] observes that ‘The U.S. government and, specifically, its intelligence
and military leaders, are increasingly stressing the link between diamonds and
terrorists’. Since the war against terrorism financing has started in 2001, the plausibility
of abuse of the diamond trade by terrorists and their financers have been stressed.
In its 2002 reportGuidance for Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorist Financing
the FATF details specific cases in which a link between (illegal) diamond trade and
terrorist organisations were found. In one case a suspect bought diamonds from a rebel
organisation in an African country and smuggled these outside the country on behalf of
the terrorist organisation. A diamond trading company was used as a vehicle to wire
funds, possibly as part of a layering structure to launder the sums involved [19]. In 2003
Report Global Witness [13: 6] issued a report which—as the reports states—presents
evidence of Al Qaeda involvement in the rough diamond trade since 1990. The report
states that ‘the trade networks and routes used by Al Qaeda to gain access to rough
diamonds are the same as those used for trading conflict and illicit diamonds’. Al Qaeda
diamond related activities allegedly were initially concentrated in Kenya and Liberia and
gradually moved to Sierra Leone and Tanzania, but after severe repressive actions by
6 E.g. James Bone, Steel bracelets for King Bling, The Times, 17 June 2006.
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US forces in these regions the activities shifted to the Democratic Republic of Congo,
South Africa and Ivory Coast. Referring to a study published by Rowan Guharatna,
Global Witness claims that Al Qaeda, as a growing organisation in the 1990s became
increasingly dependent on diamonds as its main source of funding, after Al Qaeda’s
‘headquarters’ moved to Saudi Arabia in 1989 and subsequently to Sudan in 1991 (Al
Qaeda returned to Afghanistan in 1996). As generally known, Al Qaeda has grown to a
large network organisation with a wide geographical spread that is not merely confined
to the Arab region or even the African continent. This geographic spread more or less
coincides with international diamond trade lines.
However, the Global Witness report may be flawed or at the least questions can
be raised with regard to the robustness and validity of underlying data. In their study
published in 2006, Passas and Jones show themselves highly critical of the factual
basis of any report claiming an Al Qaeda—diamond nexus. Claims with regard to
involvement of any significance of terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda in diamond
trade, are based on “conflicting and weak evidence as well as vague language to
describe interfaces” [21: 29]. Similar to untaxed cigarettes [4] statements that
diamonds are an important source of funding for terrorist groups are generally not
well substantiated. Evidence presented in the international literature is at best
anecdotal and often based on the same sources [21: 20]. Individuals with alleged or
proven affiliation with terrorism groups may be involved in the trafficking of these
commodities, but that does not justify the claim that diamonds (or untaxed cigarettes,
for that matter) are a main source of funding for terrorism.
In a 2004 New York case a jeweller admitted in court that he was involved in cash
transactions which later appeared to be have a link to the illegal procurement of
weapons destined for terrorist attacks [8: 33].
In spite of the anecdotal nature of the evidence, the mere plausibility that these
lucrative (semi-)underground markets are used to raise money for illicit causes, cannot
be ignored by law enforcement and/or contra-terrorism agencies [21: 2; 4]. Further
investigation into the diamond terrorism nexus seems therefore justified. On the one
hand, attention is drawn to the vulnerabilities of the wholesale segments (both with
regard to rough and polished diamonds) of the industry [21, 24], especially since the
Kimberly Certification (discussed further on) does not apply to polished diamonds. On
the other hand it is the rather the murky world of alluvial mining that is pointed to as
poorly regulated. Alluvial mining countries, such as Sierra Leone and Angola which
provide for a fertile landscape for illegal diamond trade.
Here we touch upon another (though related) theme, well highlighted by Even-
Zohar: most AML and CFT activity in the diamond sector focuses on the wrong
part of the commercial chain. The AML regulatory framework seems to apply to
the better regulated ‘upper level’ of wholesale and distribution as is to be found in
centres like Antwerp while this approach seems to ignore the huge money
laundering and terrorism financing potential of the alluvial mining industry.
Diamonds, money laundering and ‘organised crime’
The vulnerability of the diamond sector is repeatedly illustrated by cases which,
besides involving diamonds, have one shared denominator: the relatively large
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amount of the losses involved. In 2007 criminals succeeded in accessing the vault of
a Belgian branch of a large bank specialized in diamonds, reportedly at a loss of
more than 20 million euros. In 2005 diamonds of an alleged value of €70 million
were stolen from Schiphol Airport (the Netherlands). In 2001 diamonds were stolen
from Zaventem Airport (Belgium), believed to be worth €6,5 million. Of course,
though the robberies do not constitute an act of money laundering, sooner or later the
thieves will have to launder at least part of the gains in order to reap the benefits of
their heist. Although spectacular, these acts of crime are not indicative for a
structural link between diamonds and money laundering.
As mentioned, terrorists and their financiers might not be the only ones making use
of the various qualities of diamonds as monetary commodity. A comprehensive study
into the vulnerability of the Belgium diamond sector was conducted by Ghent
University. The 300 pages report concludes that the diamond sector, back in 2001,
was ‘extremely to very vulnerable’ (zeer grote tot grote kwetsbaarheid) to organised
crime. More specifically, the report states that “criminal activities in the diamond
sector primarily concern fiscal and economic crimes, money laundering and the
trafficking of (conflict) diamonds”. The report mentions in addition that the diamond
sector is (or was in 2001) characterised by non-transparency and that “the nature of the
commodity, the (infra)structure and the reputation of the sector create additional
opportunities for abuse by persons from in- and outside the sector pertaining to
the commitment of other crimes (drug trafficking, arms trafficking,...)”. [24: 275]. The
Belgium report does not conclude that ‘organised crime’ has worked its way into the
diamond world, but it does point out structural weaknesses that make this sector
vulnerable to criminal interference. One must add that the Belgium report was written
at a time when the diamond sector only had made a start with the implementing of
AML measures and that there are no public reports known to the author evaluating
progress in this respect. AML measurements, if properly implemented and effectuated,
are likely to decrease the vulnerability to abuse by criminals and money launderers.
In a similar vain (but based on less extensive research of one particular ‘sweet
spot’ such as Antwerp) Passas and Jones conclude that the diamond industry as a
whole is vulnerable to any type of illegal activity. However, referring to the notion of
trade based money laundering, they add that non-transparency—as one of the main
causes for this vulnerability—is not confined to the diamond industry but constitutes
a more general concern for all trade in high-value commodities [21].
In its 2002 report on organised crime in the Netherlands, the Center of Research and
Documentation reports a (police) case in which a Belgian jeweller has been found guilty
of money laundering by making large cash deposits pretended to be related to diamond
transactions. The transactions were not real nor did the diamonds actually exist, but the
cash deposits did not draw the attention since they fitted in the overall pattern of the
jeweller’s banking history and were not much different from that of other jewellers who
were not involved in such money laundering schemes. The jeweller got a commission
from the criminals, to whom he returned only part of the value.
The FATF Typologies Report of February 2002 is the first in this report series to
mention diamond smuggling as potential problem area in relation to money laundering.
The diamond market is more extensively discussed in the following Typologies report,
issued 12months later. The report mentions that “[s]everal FATFmembers indicated [...]
that they had concrete cases of criminal use of the diamond trade for money laundering.
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In one case, for example, a bank had blocked the account and filed a SARwith regard to
transactions of, what later appeared, to be a fraudster attempting to launder his proceeds
via a number of jewellers by attempting to channel large sums to them, amounting to a
total value of USD 8.2million” (FATFTypologies Report 2002–2003: 26). Another case
mentioned by the FATF “[...] relates to a company with its registered office in an
offshore centre, whose corporate object was especially broad and which, in particular
encompassed diamond trading. The account that this company held in country Y formed
the object of numerous international funds transfers in foreign currencies originating in a
tax haven. The funds, in very large sums, were then systematically and immediately
withdrawn in cash. These withdrawals were made in large denominations of foreign
currencies by a third party, who was a director of companies active in diamond trading.
In view of the regularity of some of these operations, it was difficult to associate them
with any legal commercial activity in the diamond sector, where one would expect the
level of the funds generated to fluctuate. From information gathered by the FIU, it
appeared that this account was used as a channelling account with the aim of hampering
any investigations into the origin and ultimate destination of funds.” [19: 122].
A few things can be learned from this case description. The criminal origin of the
funds is implied, but not explicitly stated. Could there still be plausible alternative
explanations for these ‘irregular’ money flows? Of more relevance, is the
observation that the detection of suspicious transactions results from the combination
of vigilant account management and carelessness on the side of the alleged money
launderers. The file does not say by whom the activity was reported to the FIU; it
could be the account manager of the bank of the one or more of the involved
accounts. It says that possibly the money flows would not have been recognised as
potentially relating to money laundering if the suspects would have used a regular
pattern in the transfers and withdrawals. In terms of our haystack metaphor: the
needles stuck out against the background of the haystack, because they all the same
and not resembled the natural variations of real straws. On the other hand regular
cash withdrawals, especially in combination with regular transfers from or to
designated tax havens, do ring the alarm bells in any self-respecting bank. The
jeweller involved will then be questioned about the background of these unusual
financial activities and he would have to come up with a very plausible explanation
in order to prevent the bank from filing a SAR with the applicable FIU.7
Alluvial mining fields and their inherent ML risks
It is estimated that up to 15% of the world’s rough diamonds come from informal
digging activities.8
7 Questioning the jeweller would not imply a breach of the prohibition to tipping-off the client, as long as
he will not be informed about the precise reasons for the inquiry nor the fact that a SAR will be filed with
the applicable FIU.
8 “Taking Shine off Diamonds; Professor Alyson Warhurst, of Warwick Business School Assesses the
Diamond Mining Industry Newspaper article; The Birmingham Post (England), January 20, 2007.”
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From a money laundering and terrorism financing perspective, the way alluvial
mining is currently organised, provides for a very benevolent environment, and it does
so in multiple ways. Alluvial mining, also called ‘artisanal mining’ in countries such as
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola can be labelled as practices of modern slavery in
which economic dependencies are shaped in the form of debt-bonding by which the
stronger exploit the weaker. [8, 17, 29]. What is more important, is that the alluvial
mining sector is cash based, which provides for a grey economy prone to smuggling,
laundering and secret meetings with terrorism financiers and arms dealers and the
circumventing of the Kimberly Certification Process (see below) by ‘changing’ the
origin of the smuggled diamonds. Many active dealers are not licensed, but still able to
run their business, e.g. on the basis of bribes paid to the local war lord or a corrupt law
enforcement representative, which makes them prone to be involved in any kind of
illicit activity by their benetor. The dividing line between the white, grey and black
markets is blurred by all conceivable grey shades (see also [8].
The layered structure of the alluvial mining business—characterized by a delta of
interdependencies from the lowest ranks of the actual workers to the higher ranks of
the dealers—provides for multiple incentives to smuggle diamonds outside the
formal paths resulting in significant underground trade. The following are mentioned
by Even-Zohar [8: 131]:
& avoidance of (artificial) low pricing on grey and black markets
& in response to inequities in resource distribution: the licensed miner may bypass
his supporting dealer and get a better price for his stones by smuggling them and
trading them on his own account
& money laundering
& other criminal activity
& evasion of taxes and fees levied by the state authorities
& opportunity to earn on exchange rate fluctuations
Although the risk of money laundering is generally acknowledged, it is not the
primary driver for underground trading. The socio-economic conditions and the
many injustices in the system, especially for those positioned at the lower levels of
the chain (miners and dealers), explain for the major part of the black and grey
alluvial mining economy. Money laundering and terrorist financing most probably
play only a marginal role.
Widening the focus, one may observe that most of the diamond money is not made
in the mining areas but in the cutting centres. “Few know that diamonds are India’s
highest value export and the industry employs more than one million people” and that
India’s 2005 export of cut and polished diamonds was estimated at $11,2 billion.9
Whereas the transparency of the Indian business sector in general is a topic of
controversy—the Indian economy is rich of practices which from a typical Western
point of view are regarded as corrupt—one can imagine the risks of diamond related
money laundering in this country alone, let alone world wide.
9 Taking Shine off Diamonds; Professor Alyson Warhurst, of Warwick Business School Assesses the
Diamond Mining Industry Newspaper article; The Birmingham Post (England), January 20, 2007.
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Global standards in combating ML and TF
The diamond industry has been brought within the perimeter of international AML
and CFT standards in the period 2001–2006. In this period the FATF issued the
second revision of the 40+9 recommendations (published on 22 June 2003), which
in Europe was duly followed by the Third Money Laundering Directive (2005/60/
EC). FATF Directive 12 distinguishes ‘dealers in precious stones’ as one of the
designated non-financial businesses to which Recommendations 5, 6, 8 and 11
apply. These recommendations boil down to the very basics of AML: no anonymous
accounts should be kept; customer due diligence will be performed, including proper
identifications of the ultimate beneficial owner(s); additional risk management must
be in place to identify and perform diligence on Politically Exposed Persons; the
jeweler should within the margins of reasonability keep pace with new money
laundering techniques and have in place risk mitigating measures; unusually large or
unusual transactions should be monitored. Recommendation 13, in addition, obliges
the jeweller to submit a suspicious or unusual transaction report to the FIU if the
transaction is unusual or potentially related to money laundering or terrorism
financing. The inclusion of the dealers in precious stones in scope of application of
these Recommendations, implicitly acknowledges the jeweller as a ‘financial
institution’ in terms of the FATF recommendations. This does not mean that
according to the FATF the diamond brokers and retailers provide financial services,
but simply that most of the AML and CFT regulations are equally applicable to those
dealing in precious stones. Dealers in precious stones are explicitly referred to as one
of the ‘Designated non-financial businesses and professions’.
However, there is a catch. Recommendations 12 and 13 concern only those
dealers in precious stones ‘when they engage in any cash transaction with customers
equal to or above the applicable designated threshold’. The ‘designated threshold’ is
currently set to $/€15.000. At face value this is an odd limitation of the scope of the
Recommendations. Although the diamond sector is ruled by informal protocols, this
does not mean that transactions are often cash payments. On the contrary! The
exoneration clause, therefore, seems to exclude the major part of the regular
diamond trading companies. Was this really intended by the FATF? When the
FATF’s recommendations are taken literally then a diamond trading company should
have a complete AML system in place when cash payments of above €15.000 are
accepted or that it is likely that these will be accepted in the near future. It seems that
the FATF did not want to bother the diamond sector too much with the fight against
money laundering. The FATF’s approach is in line with the fact that the primary
money laundering and terrorism financing worries concern the cash based trade in
rough stones. The local mining companies and those involved in the alluvial mining
industry actually are the more likely ‘suspects’ when it comes to money laundering
(especially in the broad interpretation of this term in most legal systems, which
encompasses the mere smuggling of money or other value bearers). They are also are
more likely to handle cash as part of common business practice.
Nevertheless, the FATF’s limitation to cash based trading in precious stones
seems at odds with the main drivers behind the FATF efforts to combat money
laundering: the prevention of money laundering and the safeguarding of the integrity
of the financial system. Granted, the diamond sector as such is not considered part of
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the financial system in a strict sense, but that does not mean that the integrity of the
diamonds sector by itself is not something worth pursuing. In addition one can argue
that the diamond and the financial sector are entwined, given the high degree to
which diamond trading is actually financed by loans from banks. In addition,
referring to what has been observed above about the difficulty to objectively
determine a diamond’s value and to the inward-looking nature of the diamond sector,
the diamond trade is highly vulnerable to money laundering.10 It was the FATF itself
that has presented cases reported by its member countries which show that the
involvement of the diamond sector in money laundering and terrorism financing is
not limited to the cash-based part of the diamond trade, but extends to the myriad of
(seemingly) respectable diamond trading firms whose multi millions of wire
transfers annually provide for the perfect hiding place of transfers related to crime
or terrorism. The shift of focus by the FATF experts towards the phenomenon of so-
called trade based money laundering makes it rather incomprehensible if the FATF
would not extend the scope of the Recommendations to the entire diamond sector.
It must be noted that under the current Belgian Anti-Money Laundering Law of
March 22, 1993 (as amended on January 12, 2004) cash transactions are outright
forbidden. Here also it is uncertain what motivated the Belgian legislator to create
such a rigid rule. As no other country has the same provision the Belgian law has
provided its own diamond traders with a competitive handicap.
The Third EU Directive contains provisions in line with the FATF Recommenda-
tions, such as article 18: “Dealers in high-value goods, such as precious stones or
metals, or works of art, and auctioneers are in any event covered by this Directive to
the extent that payments to them are made in cash in an amount of €15.000 or more.”
Also here the scope of the AML regulation, to the extent dealers in precious stones are
concerned, is limited to cash transactions. By the end of 2007 the EU Member States
had implemented the Third Directive into their national legislation [23].
Regardless of what interpretation one adheres to with regard to the Recommen-
dations, the diamond sector itself has acknowledged the importance of compliance
with AML standards. It was the erstwhile chairman of De Beers, Nicky
Oppenheimer, who (in what is believed to be his briefest key note ever) was the
first to openly acknowledge this and to proclaim that De Beers wholeheartedly
embraces the AML and CTF standards as promoted by the FATF [8: 13]. This may
well be a strategic move, motivated by self-preservation rather than anything else.
But that does not matter at all. It also shows the keen wits of Oppenheimer, who may
have understood and foreseen very well the future importance of compliance as part
of a broader ethically-coloured notion of sustainability and corporate citizenship. He
was right to see that these broader social developments were not confined to the
financial sector, but would encompass all types of businesses. The next question is,
what has the diamond sector done to become compliant and to prevent money
laundering and terrorism financing?
10 Although it must be observed that by the same token, it is difficult for outsiders to penetrate the sector
and abuse it for money laundering purposes.
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Kimberley process
Whereas the FATF primarily seeks to mend loopholes in the regulatory system to the
extent these relate specifically to money laundering and terrorist financing, the
international diamond trade is vulnerable to other crimes than only these two. Especially
the use of ‘blood’ diamonds to finance military activity in armed conflict, poses a serious
threat to the diamond sector as a whole. Basically the underlying though is quite similar.
The anti-money laundering regime and contra-terrorism financing provisions aim to
protect the integrity of the financial system as a whole and to avoid ‘contamination’ by
‘dirty’ money as much as possible. In the same line of thought the diamond sector has
much to gain from avoiding contamination of the sector by ‘blood’ diamonds. Since
November 2002 this got its shape in the form of the Kimberly Process Certification
Scheme. The Kimberly Process, named after the city in South Africa where it was
initiated, is an inter-governmental initiative to curb abuse of the regular diamond
industry by warlords and other beneficiaries involved in the trade of ‘blood’ diamonds.
The participants to the Process have initiated and implemented a certification scheme
which ensures that all diamonds traded are provided with documentation authenticating
their provenance. The parties involved11 agree to exchange diamonds with Kimberley
Process nations only and to provide confirmation (by a Kimberley Certificate) that
their diamonds have not been used to fund illegal groups. The Kimberly Process is
strongly supported by the UN General Assembly (A/RES/55/56 2001) and the UM
Security Council (Resolution 1459, 2003).
Implementation of AML and CFT by the diamond sector
As mentioned before, the Kimberly process primarily seeks to remedy the lack of
transparency with regard to the origin of the stones. From the very beginning the
effectiveness of the Kimberley Agreement has been questioned, primarily because of
the lack of proper controls and the possibility of blood diamonds being smuggled to
neighbouring countries which serve as a ‘legitimate’ provenance [11]; diamonds can
be ‘laundered’ as well. The focus on conflict areas has invoked the criticism that the
Kimberley Process overlooks the bad conditions in non-conflict and post-conflict
mining area’s [29].
Even if the certification system would function optimally, then there is no guarantee
that the certified stones will not become part of a money laundering or terrorism
financing scheme [12]. In addition the Kimberly Certification Scheme was not
effectively implemented in the diamond industry. A survey by Amnesty International
and Global Witness pointed out that awareness of staff or retailers seem to be lacking
and the majority of diamond traders either had no policy in place or were unwilling to
11 Angola, Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic,
People’s Republic of China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, European Union
States, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Namibia, Norway, New Zealand,
Russian Federation, Singapore, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand,
Togo, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Taiwan
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cooperate with the survey.12 The report holds the branch organisations—the World
Diamond Council, the World Federation of Diamond Bourses and the International
Diamond Manufacturers Association—who have publicly committed themselves to
the Kimberley Process responsible for not properly implementing and monitoring
compliance with the Kimberley agreement [1].
But the fault is not only to the diamond sector: the authorities of the states who
have signed the Kimberley Agreement admit they are not capable to prevent abuse
of the system. In its 2002 report the US General Accounting Office states that “The
United States cannot detect diamonds that might come from conflict sources because
the current diamond control system does not require certification of the country of
extraction.” [12: 2]. The weak spot of the Kimberley certification mechanism is that
it sees to the certification of the country of provenance rather than actual origin of
the precious stones.
As has been pointed out by others [8, 29] proper certification does not prevent
diamonds being bought with money obtained from criminal activities and it certainly
does not prevent the stones from being bought and sold by terrorism financiers. The
certificates do not contain an up-to-date list of those through whose hands the
precious stones have passed. It does, therefore, not provide an extra paper trail that
might be an extra obstacle for money launderers. This has been acknowledged by the
diamond sector as well and it does certainly not rely on the Kimberly Certification as
a pre-emptive anti-money laundering measure. The main diamond traders have, to a
more or lesser extend, implemented international standards as laid down in the
FATF’s 40+9 recommendations.13 A key role was, and still is played, by De Beers,
who used the powerful position of its Diamond Trading Center (DTC) to force their
clients, the so-called sight-holders, to become compliant too. By now the major
diamond traders have adopted Compliance policies and programs to implement
AML and CFT provisions and to be able to comply with the Kimberley Agreement.
As De Beers—through the DTC—is accustomed to simply prescribe its clients the
conditions under which they may supply, it may be expected that the De Beers
commitment to the AML regulatory framework is more than just lip service.
In the United Sates the Jewelers Vigilance Committee has issued a country-wide
applicable comprehensive ‘AML Program Compliance Kit’ at the beginning of
2006. The Compliance Kit contains a recommendation that jewellery traders perform
due diligence on third parties as well. Whereas on the one hand the relevant clause
seems to acknowledge the fact that in this type of trade third party involvement is
not uncommon and certainly not suspicious by implication, it also seeks to cover
12 In the American Jewellers trade association Jewellers of America sent out the advisory statement: “it is
imperative to respond promptly to questions from NGOs, media, or consumers about conflict diamonds, as
well as other social, ethical, and environmental issues, should they be asked“.
13 A source close to the author disclosed that the Antwerp Diamond sector was rather slow to realize that a
Belgium report critical of the diamond sector could be used to the benefit of the branch’s good reputation.
Strong efforts by the sector’s main players to prevent publication of the report—a vulnerability analysis of
criminologist of the University of Ghent—were, at last converted into a public embracement of the report
culminating in an implicit pseudo-claim of intellectual ownership of the report. The branch showed that it
realised that allowing this type of ‘educated’ (self)criticism is a first and required step in demonstrating the
willingness and ability to become compliant with international standards.
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potential loopholes in compliance as a result of deliberate use of third parties to
circumvent ‘standard’ due diligence of ‘first’ parties. Of course it remains to be seen
how the diamond traders will pick up on this recommendation. The impact of the US
legislation in combination with this Compliance Kit will be significant: almost 100%
of the polished diamonds, at some point in their existence, passes through the US
[7]. Other large diamond trading companies followed the example set by the Beers
and implemented policies that commit the company to adherence to AML, CFT and
the Kimberley Certification scheme. Although no evidence has been included in this
study that these companies keep true to their word, the policies look fairly robust and
give the impression that, at least to some extent, the AML wind of change affects the
way diamond business in conducted by established market players.
Who will supervise the diamond sector?
In the diamond sector several entities emerged or presented itself as key contributors
to the self-regulation of the sector: the World Diamond Council, Jewelers of
America, the Jewelers Vigilance Committee, the International Diamond Manufac-
turers Association, etcetera. The progress made by the diamond sector and on the
legislative front, although very important as a start, may simply fall short if
compliance is not enforced by a strong regulator [14].14
Self-regulation and top-down statutory regulation often suffer from the same
deficit: neither are strong enough to enforce compliance. It is a widely known fact
that, the AML regulatory framework—in general—can only be successful in case of
a strong commitment of the legislator to establish a strong regulatory body. Most
Western countries have appointed one or more regulators and assigned them
effective regulatory powers. For the financial sector often the National Banks have
been given the task of monitoring compliance with AML and CTF regulations. The
efficacy of oversight may well be grounded in the fact that AML compliance is
merely part and parcel of a more encompassing relationship between the regulator
and the financial institutions. Not only the mere ability to—as an ultimate
recourse—withdraw a banking licence, but also specialist knowledge within the
regulator of the banking sector is a core ingredient of effective supervision.
It is yet unsure how this will turn out for the diamond sector. Countries have only
made a first start with enacting and implementing provisions that seek to make the
diamond sector AML compliant. In the Netherlands, for example, the Bureau for
Financial Supervision (Bureau Financieel Toezicht) has been appointed regulator for
the trade in precious stones. It is the same body that also monitors AML compliance
for accountants, attorneys, bankruptcy liquidators, providers of financial advice, to
name only a few professions. It is obvious that quite different specialisms are
required within a supervisory bureau that has to regulate such different activities.
The primary task for such a regulator is to verify whether the diamond traders have
implemented risk assessment procedures and policies that are deemed sufficiently
effective in detecting potential money laundering activity and, thus, serve to protect
14 Similar conclusions have been drawn with regard to the real estate sector [6].
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the company from being abused. However, setting up a framework that looks good
on paper, is something quite different than the actual implementation of a effective
protective filter against money laundering activity. This is even more true for the
diamond sector: due to its very nature and inherent opacity, the diamond sector is
prone to money laundering and it will be difficult for any regulator that is not deeply
familiar with the business, to see whether AML provisions suffice or whether they
lack strength. However, there might be some light at the horizon in the form of
diamond trade financiers acting as ‘surrogate’ regulators. The question is to what
extent banks are willing and capable of doing the job.
Implementation by the diamond sector financiers
A relatively large proportion of the diamond sector activities is financed by external
capital [27]. In 2001 De Ruyver cs. observes that on average the solvability of the
diamond trading firms is roughly ten times lower than the solvability of other
wholesale companies [24: 50]. This increases the credit risk for the financier. In
addition, the credit is not provided on the basis of available stock, but mostly on
supplies ‘on the move’. Table 1 shows the amount financed by way of credits
provided by banks in absolute figures (in the diamond sector the US Dollar accepted
as the key currency).
Traders of precious stones have formally been included in AML regulatory
frameworks since approximately 2006, by recognizing them as non-financial
businesses to which the AML provisions apply. Banks, however, were brought
under the scope of AML regulation much earlier, namely from the moment the FATF
issued its 40 recommendations in April 1990, and after these were implemented in
national regulatory frameworks. This means that banks, as financial institutions,
have a much longer history in AML compliance than the diamond traders, who in
this respect are still the ‘new kids on the block’. Indirectly AML provisions were
already applied to the diamond traders in their capacity as clients of banks and other
financial service providers. Banks nowadays have implemented complex processes
to ensure compliance. Most banks, for example, perform a background check on
new clients and the nationality or main location of the client is included as one
parameter in the due diligence survey. Most banks identify conflict countries and
conflict diamond countries as posing a higher risk on clients conducting business in
or with these countries. Such client will either be refused or additional due diligence
and more stringent monitoring is applied. Some banks also assess the risk of the
Table 1 Global diamond industry banking indeptness in Ml. US dollars
1999 2003 2004 2005
Antwerp 1.920 2.390 2.550 2.900
Mumbai 1.430 2.800 2.900 4.000
Tel Aviv 1.060 1.700 2.000 2.045
New York 1.300 1.800 1.850 2.000
Total 5.710 8.690 9.300 10.945
Source: ABN AMRO
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business sector a client is primarily active in and the diamond sector may therefore
as a whole be considered to adding to the risk in the profile of a client.
The question can be raised whether the widening of the scope of AML and the
inclusion of the diamond sector in the application AML provisions by the FATF and
legislative bodies has brought a shift in the division of labour and responsibilities in the
relation between diamond traders and their financial service providers. Formally this is,
of course, not the case. The new responsibilities of the diamond traders (if they apply) do
not derogate to the existing responsibilities of the financial service providers: they are
still gatekeepers and expected to do their part in protecting the financial system.
However, extending AML regulations to diamond traders does, in a metaphorical sense,
create an extra gate that, if it functions well, serves as an extra filter. Banks are in a way
of speaking ‘released’ from the first line of defence and have become the second line of
defence. In practical terms the difference between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ situation is
much more complex. Before diamond traders were included in the AML regulatory
framework, the provisions reached as far as the clients of the banks—no further. Now
the diamond industry has vowed to be(come) compliant as well, the provisions will
reach as far the clients of the diamond traders. The difference is that respected and
‘clean’ diamond traders in the past could benefit from business relationships with
partners who would not survive a properly executed due diligence review. To a certain
extent, banks could ‘hide’ behind the due diligence outcome with regard to their
reputable diamond clients and refrain from investigating the business partners of these.
Banks could trust on the obligation by the diamond traders to report any irregularities
in the dealings of the diamond trader with his own business partners. However, there
was no formal framework that further detailed this ‘obligation’ and much depended on
the sincerity of the client or the with of the bank’s account manager. In a manner of
speaking, since long informal due diligence, embedded in mutual trust, had been part
and parcel of the way business was conducted in the diamond sector.
In many ways the wind of change also affects the relation between bank and
diamond trader. Now the diamond sector has pledged compliance with AML
regulations—which enables us to leave aside the cash-related ‘scope of application’-
matter as discussed above—banks are able to include audit provisions in their
contractual agreements. Banks demand from their clients to conduct business in a
legitimate way (as they have to under their own AML obligations) and are now able
to support for this demand by conducting actual audits with their diamond trading
clients. If they do, the diamond trader has to provide insight in how due diligence
and transaction monitoring and suspicious activity reporting is implemented and
integrated with daily business. How are risks related to clients or potential clients
assessed? What processes are in place? How is internally monitored that these
processes are properly applied, et cetera? In fact, the financial service provider may
thus assume the role of supervisor/regulator in his dealings with diamond traders.
Now, why would the financial service provider want this?
The answer to that question is relatively simple. Market players both in the
diamond sector and in the financial sector heavily depend on their good reputation,
as has been widely acknowledged [8, 18]. The concern for the good reputation and
the acknowledgement of the vulnerability of a good name (which comes by foot and
goes by horse, as the expression goes) forms the very basis of any sector specific
compliance policy.
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As mentioned earlier, some banks classify all parties connected to the diamond trade
as increased risk clients. This means that additional due diligence is performed and, in
special cases, that transactions are more closely monitored. The implication is that on top
of minimal standards adhered to by the bank (and internally imposed on its staff) the
bank has additional control mechanisms and safeguards in place to mitigate potential
money laundering risks, which are considered inherent to the diamond trade. In other
words, on top of standard business due diligence enhanced due diligence is performed,
by default. Interestingly, some banks use positive referencing as a component of their
enhanced due diligence process. This feature, which is quite unique in modern day
banking, is reminiscent of the ‘old times’ of the diamond sector, in which cross-
referencing formed the basis of the system of mutual trust from one insider to another.
In the global AML framework a shift has taken place from a rule based to a risk
based system, in which the major financial institutions have been accredited much
more discretionary power in their decision whether to file a SAR report [4, 5]. In a
much wider context this shift has initiated a more general rethinking in risk
management in the financial world. Under the Basel II agreements financial
institutions are stimulated (or actually compelled) to take into account a much
broader and more diversified risk picture, which does not only include capital and
credit risks (as under the Basel I accord) but virtually all risks that might eventually
jeopardise a bank’s soundness.
Under Basel II banks that have diamond companies in their credit portfolios
already have demonstrated that ‘the old rules’ of lending to diamond trading firms
do not apply any more. Credit will no longer be provided solely on the ground of a
long standing good relationship. Instead the assets and activities that are to be
financed by the loan are assessed and valued by the banks with much more accuracy
than before. Assets that have been overvalued in the past, will no longer qualify for
refinancing. Banks have not only obtained a much stronger position (relative to the
diamond sector) than before, they are actually prepared to wield their power to set
new boundaries and to impose new rules for lending [7]. The times in which a gap
existed between diamond sector related financial practices and benchmark risk
appetite and risk acceptance as applied by banks to other industries, seem to have
come to an end. After the 2008 credit crunch and the financial crisis—which have
made Basel II more relevant than ever—banks will be even more cautious and refuse
any credit facility that is not guaranteed by properly assessed and sufficiently valued
collateral. One important element of these developments is that it will, hopefully,
drive to more transparency throughout the diamond sector. The main diamond
financing banks have become a strong antagonist to De Beers and if banks will
consistently bring into practice their new principles, then this will seriously affect the
De Beers monopoly with regard to the sight-holder system [7]. In the context of
money laundering, in a much similar vain to Basel II, the focus has shifted towards a
broader notion of suspicious or unusual activity, such as is included in the notion of
trade based money laundering [9]. Consequentially, it seems that the financial
institutions, as gate keepers, have to embrace a less formal and therefore broader
notion of the Know Your Customer (KYC) principle. Under the rule-based approach
the emphasis was merely on the proper identification of the client by checking the ID
documents, and the identification of unusual transactions by way of checking these
against objective criteria. To an increasing extent it is expected from the financial
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service providers that their account managers and relationship bankers are also aware
of standard behaviour in the industry the client is or claims to be active in. That is,
the account manager must be able to compare the pattern of services commissioned
by the client against the background of patterns common in the clients business
sector. A client’s transaction history has to stay within a range of what is normally to
be expected from such a client in such a branch, otherwise questions will be posed.
This is not yet current practice, at least not in full. However a gradual trend towards
this direction can be observed, mainly fanned by the FATF and picked up by the
regulators. Major banks already have included in their policies provisions that, at the
very least, aim to create awareness among relationship bankers and account
managers of their newly perceived roles.
It is an issue of debate whether the financial service providers are or should be
happy with this trend, since it will bring a huge change in the (key) role of
relationship bankers and account managers. However, for the often highly
specialized diamond branches, this might give fewer problems than for other less
specialized branched. As relationship bankers they are already specialized to a high
degree and they know what is going on in their clients market in terms of
commercial activity and developments. This gives good prospects for this particular
branch in banking to become even more compliant with domestic and international
regulatory frameworks. Diamond financiers may be up to the challenge posed by
progressive, risk-based money laundering policies.
However, there is also an inescapable tension between the relationships banker
tasks as a ‘gatekeeper’ and the profit-driven nature of his core-business: providing
banking services. In practice this will mean that whatever room for interpretation
there is, the relationship banker—and also back office support e.g. from the in-house
legal and AML departments—will opt for the most convenient interpretation. Here
the responsibility of the bank ends and the responsibility for the supervisor, regulator
and/or legislator starts. Ultimately the financial service provider can not be held
responsible for all that is wrong in the world of diamond trading and financing.
Has the diamond sector become more transparent?
The real question is whether the diamond industry has become more transparent as a
result of the developments in the past decades. This question cannot be answered
with a simple yes or no.
First one must distinguish between different spheres of transparency. Transparency
comes in many forms and shapes, as is illustrated by a quote from an interview15 with
the managing director of the High Council for Diamonds, Freddy Hanard. He stated
that his organisation ‘needs to be completely transparent and accountable’, but as it
appears, this merely refers to the ‘democratic’ governance structure of the High
Council and not necessarily to the transparency in terms of AML and CFT.
Nevertheless the question can be raised whether the diamond sector has become more
transparent internally, that is towards the key players, other players and newcomers in
and to the sector. Has the diamond sector becomemore transparent towards the financiers
15 Antwerp facets Magazine, Volume 3, Edition 3, July 2006.
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of the diamond traders? Have the financiers become more transparent, e.g. towards the
regulator? Finally, have both the diamond sector and the financing of diamonds become
more transparent towards the public in broad? Even if these questions are answered
positively one can also ask whether an increase in (overall) transparency has made the
‘upper world’ diamond sector more secure and less involved in (alleged) criminal
activity, money laundering, terrorism financing and the trading of conflict diamonds.
Whether the diamond sector has become more transparent internally is a complex
issue and not easily to answer. The exclusion of outsiders does not automatically imply
that the sector is internally opaque. Rather on the opposite: when trust and trusted
reference are key notions in bilateral engagements, then a ‘closed’ circuit and ‘exclusive
membership’make the branch internally more transparent compared to the situation that
the market has a low threshold and outsiders are easily invited to join the trade. On the
other hand, the very notion of trust stands in the way of objective scrutiny by the trading
partners: ignoring ‘the word of a friend’—that is, performing further due diligence—is
considered inapt, a token of lack of trust. On the other hand: violating trust can have far
reaching social and commercial repercussions.
However, changes have been brought to the diamond sector also from the outside,
namely from the well regulated financial service providers that service the diamond
industry. Developments in the context of Basel II and, in addition, the 2008 financial
crisis, have triggered banks to reconsider existing practices with regard to the financing
of diamond related activities. This is expected to bring increased transparency, albeit
within the parameters of the often undisclosed relationship between the diamond
companies and their financiers.
Despite the effort of many countries legislator’s to bring dealers in precious stones
under the umbrella of AML controls, external transparency is still not achieved to a
satisfying extent. In part this is due to the lack of a dedicated regulator, a governmental
watch dog equipped with sufficient powers to enforce compliance. On the other hand, it
seems that the commitment of the diamond sector to international AML standards and
the self-commitment as shown in the Kimberly-process, although not yet to the whole
nine yards, has brought a ‘wind of change’, also in terms of transparency. Even-Zohar
who might be considered an expert in his field, is rather positive, in particular about the
developments in the US: “From now one, no one will ever be able to claim that our
business isn’t sufficient transparent, that its supply chain is opaque, or that there are
unknown players. From a business perspective—and forgive me for these words—it
seems that we are now engaged in a massive and collective “striptease”—soon we will
know almost everything about everybody. And we must keep the information on file for
anywhere between 5 to 7 years, depending on the jurisdiction.”
The question is whether all diamond traders, or at least the large majority, will fully
comply with the rules and, even if so, whether formal compliance with the law and
international standards will indeed prevent the diamond sector from being affected by
money laundering, terrorist financing and the trading of conflict diamonds. This
question, however, brings us into a entirely different theme: whether current AML and
CFT ‘best practices’ are indeed contributing to decreasing money laundering and
terrorist financing or effectively keep the financial system and the upper world economy
clean from tainted money. This is a theme that we will not further explore here.
Overall we must conclude that, with the inclusion of the trade in precious stones
under the umbrella of AML thinking, a new course has been set out which gradually
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seems to force at least the bigger market players to become more vigilant, more
transparent and more compliant with international AML standards. To what extent
this development will truly bring a change, the future will tell.
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